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Luncheon Address
Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law
The power of Congress to define federal crimes has been
exercised more and more in recent years to criminalize conduct
primarily and traditionally the concern of the several states.
Although I refer to this development as the federalization of
criminal law, a law school faculty colleague tells me that I

(

should use the term "nationalization" rather than
"federalization."

Of course, he also thinks that the original

Federalists and Anti-Federalists called themselves by the wrong
names.

With all due respect to some of those present, academics

certainly know how to confuse an issue.

To be fair, academics

are not the only ones who cause confusion.

There is a Federalist

Society whose members likewise seem unable to distinguish
Federalists from Anti-Federalists.

However it is described, the

development to which I refer has had and continues to have some
serious consequences worthy of our attention.

Before reviewing

those consequences, I turn to an examination of how and why the
federal government has come to be involved in the prosecution of
crimes historically handled at the state level.
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In urging ratification of the Constitution, the Framers
assured their countrymen that "internal order," as they called
it, would be the. responsibility of the several states.

The

Constitution itself refers only to a few specific crimes:
counterfeiting; treason; piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas; and offenses against the law of nations.

The earliest

Congresses found authority in these provisions, in their
enumerated powers and in the Necessary and Proper Clause to
classify as criminal various types of conduct generally thought
to be detrimental to the operations of the central government.
customs offenses, crimes committed within federal enclaves and
interference with the federal courts fell within this category of
exclusive federal jurisdiction.

All other varieties of crimes

were defined by state legislatures and prosecuted in state
courts.
As the nation expanded and the population increased in the
aftermath of the Civil War, new forms of anti-social conduct came
to the attention of Congress.

In response to the "green cigar"

scam and other quaint frauds then current, Congress included an
anti-fraud provision in the 1872 codification of the postal laws.
Thus was born the notion that the national interest required
federal prosecution of any scheme or artifice to defraud as long
as the mails were involved.

The sponsor of the postal

legislation said that the mail fraud provision was necessary "to
prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities
. by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the
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purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people of the
country."

Although Congress could point to its constitutional

power to establish post offices as authority for the legislation,
this concept of fraud as a federal crime marked the first serious
trenching on state criminal jurisdiction.
At the turn of the century, Congress discovered the
Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of criminal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court approved, and the criminal law never has been
the same.

The supposed need to protect the channels of

interstate commerce led to the enactment of the Lottery Act,
prohibiting the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, and
the Mann Act, prohibiting the transportation of women across
state lines to engage in immoral practices.

The latter statute

impelled my late colleague, Henry Friendly, to ask this
rhetorical question in his 1972 lecture on federal jurisdiction:
"Why should the federal government care if a Manhattan
businessman takes his mistress to sleep with him in Greenwich,
Connecticut, although it would not if the love-nest were in Port
Chester, N.Y.?"

Judge Friendly questioned whether federal

criminal prosecutions of this type serve any true federal
interest.

I question whether such prosecutions constitute a

threat to the dual system of government so carefully constructed
by the Framers of our Constitution.
Misuse of the channels of commerce has formed an important
theoretical underpinning for the ongoing expansion of federal
criminal jurisdiction.

Under this rubric, Congress has
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replicated many state criminal statutes, adding only an
interstate element:

kidnapping, theft, transportation of stolen

vehicles, flight to avoid prosecution, sexual exploitation of
children, firearms offenses and gambling are some examples.

As

recently as 1984, a whole new slew of state-type offenses were
federalized on the basis of interstate movement.

These included

the counterfeiting of credit cards and theft of livestock having
a value in excess of $10,000.

Yes indeed, cattle rustling is now

a federal crime!
When the Supreme Court approved congress·ional -regulation of
activities affecting commerce, it sanctioned the most expansive
basis for criminal intervention in crime control yet invoked.
This concept provided the shaky constitutional support necessary
for such legislation as the Hobbs Act, which reaches the local
crimes of robbery and extortion, and the Extortionate Credit
Transaction Act, which reaches the local crime of loansharking.
The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which now generates
more than twenty percent of all federal criminal prosecutions,
includes a congressional declaration that federal prosecution of
intrastate drug trafficking is necessary for the control of the
interstate incidents of trafficking.

Here again, the "affecting

commerce" concept was called upon as authority for federalizing
crimes punishable in all states of the Union.

The Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act not only is grounded in
the same interpretation of the commerce power but also includes
in its definition of racketeering activity a list of specific
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crimes chargeable under state law.

The Travel Act is another

example of a statute involving a wholesale incorporation of state
crimes.

The list goes on.

I think that the impetus for the expansion of federal
criminal law into areas of state and local concern has come from
three directions:

from Congress; from federal prosecutors; and

from local and state governments themselves.

In the case of

Congress, a common procedure is to identify a problem involving
unacceptable conduct in one state or region, classify that
conduct as criminal, and define it in terms of a new federal
crime, regardless of whether it is already a state crime.

This

procedure is often unaccompanied by any determination of the
willingness or ability of state government to deal with the
problem.

Federal prosecutors have been known to argue for

expansive interpretations of federal criminal legislation in an
effort to fill perceived gaps in local criminal prosecution.

An

example is the use of the mail fraud statute to prosecute local
criminal corruption.
with these arguments.

Unfortunately, the courts often go along
Chief Justice Burger once opined that, as

new types of frauds develop, the mail fraud statute can be used
as a stopgap device to deal with the new phenomenon on a
temporary basis until specific legislation is enacted.

Finally,

state and local governments, complaining of a lack of resources,
find it convenient to defer to federal prosecution rather than to
face up to issues they are actually in a better position to
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confront.

Sometimes, of course, a breakdown in local law

enforcement leaves federal intervention as the only alternative.
Reform in the criminal justice system is the theme of
today's Conference, and reform in the criminal justice system
requires consideration of the consequences of the federalization
of criminal law.

Some of the consequences are obvious and some

are not so obvious, but they all implicate important pragmatic
and constitutional problems.

The consequence most obvious to me,

of course, is the overloading of federal courts brought about by
the prosecution of cases lacking in any direct fedei~l"interest
or involvement.

We see such cases every day and can only wonder

why they are not prosecuted in the state courts, which are fully
equipped to handle them.

That a bank is federally insured, for

example, does not seem to create a very great federal interest
for conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases
involving one hundred dollar bank thefts.

Yet there is a statute

that confers federal jurisdiction in just such cases.

The

federal courts should be reserved for such important direct
federal interest crimes as capturing or killing carrier pigeons
owned by the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 45; interstate
transportation of water hyacinths, 18

u.s.c.

§

46; false crop

reports, 18 U.S.C. § 2072; and false weather reports, 18
2074.

u.s.c.

Between 1983 and 1987, criminal filings in the United

States District Courts increased by 25% to 42,000.

In some

districts now, the courts have little time for anything but
criminal trials.

This detracts from other important work that
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ought to be performed by those courts, including what I consider
to be their most important work -- the protection of individual
civil rights and civil liberties when the states have failed to
do so.

Court overload is a serious consequence indeed.

Every time Congress rushes to enact a criminal statute to
deal with a problem that exists in one state or one region, there
is an erosion of the dual system of government so carefully
established by those who wrote our national charter.

What may be

considered serious anti-social conduct in one part of the country
may not be considered quite so serious elsewhere.

Gambling may

be offensive to the citizens of Utah but not to the citizens of
Nevada.

The states must be allowed to accommodate such

differences and to experiment with innovative approaches to the
prosecution of crime.

Many states already have charted new

courses in the areas of sentencing, plea bargaining, victims'
rights and other criminal procedures as well as in the definition
of substantive crimes.

State supreme courts have interpreted

state constitutions to create in criminal cases rights not
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
President Roosevelt said that a state experiment that fails
has little effect on the rest of the nation.

It is also true

that states can modify or repeal unworkable methods and
approaches much more quickly than can the national government.
By contrast, federal legislation affects the entire nation, is
cumbersome to change, and often remains on the books long after
it loses any value it once may have had.
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In this regard, I refer

you to 18

u.s.c.

§

336, which imposes criminal liability upon one

who issues a check for less than $1.00, intending it to circulate
as money.

I don't know exactly what that section means, but I

think that we can safely say that it has outlived its usefulness.
Federal courts now are bound to sentence according to
guidelines established by a Sentencing Commission.

I cannot

comment on the constitutionality of the legislation establishing
the Commission, but I can question the wisdom of turning the
federal judiciary into a corps of mechanics required to impose
criminal punishment without regard to family considerations or
local conditions.

All of this is done in the name of eliminating

disparity, a goal that is at least questionable.

A sentence

imposed without individualized consideration in federal court
that would be much different if imposed in a state court for the
same crime may serve neither the needs of the defendant nor the
community of which he is a part.

The excision of conduct

detrimental to society must be accomplished by a scalpel rather
than a chain saw.
I am afraid of federal prosecutors.
federal prosecutors.

I am terrified by

The reason for my fear is the extraordinary

discretion that they have in deciding what crimes to prosecute.

That discretion is one of the consequences of the federalization
of criminal law.
prosecutor.

Like the Attorney General, I once was a state

State prosecutors are not quite as fearsome as their

federal counterparts because their discretion is much more
limited.

When police agencies or private individuals came to me
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as district attorney with evidence of crime, I was constrained to
prosecute, unless the evidence was so deficient that no case
could be made.
constraints.
assigned.

United States Attorneys labor under no such
How could it be otherwise?

Priorities must be

There are only so many federal prosecutors, and they

cannot be tied up in prosecuting the interstate transportation of
water hyacinths.

With more federal crimes on the books than

could be prosecuted in any ordinary lifetime, government
attorneys must be very selective as to which cases they will
pursue and which they will decline.

I remember visiting a

federal prison facility in my district when I was a district
judge.

The warden begged me to persuade the U.S. Attorney to

prosecute some cases of assault on prison guards.

The

u.s.

Attorney had declined to prosecute those cases in favor of what
he considered were more important matters.

As federal crimes

proliferate, there are more declinations, some of which seem
quite arbitrary and capricious to federal law enforcement
agencies.

When there are many offenders but only a few are

chosen to be prosecuted, the public perceives that the process is
unfair.

Moreover, in making the critical decisions about what

types of anti-social conduct are worthy of attention, the
prosecutor invades the domain of the legislator, and the
separation of powers is blurred.
There is another major consequence of the ongoing expansion
of the criminal code through the inclusion of state-type offenses.
I call it "the disappointment of promises unfulfilled."
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A more

harsh description might be "the deception of the public."

As

Congress passes laws purportedly solving various problems
through the federal criminal justice system, the public often
assumes that the law is the solution.
illustrate:

Obviously, it is not.

To

Everybody knows that most narcotic transactions are

punishable under federal law.

The ordinary citizen has every

right to expect that violations will be prosecuted vigorously.
Yet nobody makes it clear that only an infinitesimal number of
the 55,000 narcotics arrests made in New York City in one year
can be prosecuted federally.
there.

The federal resources simply aren't

Congress can convert state crimes into federal crimes

forever, but United States courts and United States prosecutors
will never be able to handle more than a tiny portion of the
tens of thousands of crimes committed in the nation each year.
Great expectations lead to great disappointments, an unfortunate
consequence of too much federal criminal law.
It seems almost unnecessary to observe that two laws on the
same subject lead to duplication

duplication in investigation,

duplication in prosecution and duplication in punishment.
Recently, there was an unseemly competition between state and
federal authorities in New York City over who should pursue some
cases of municipal corruption.
to divide the work.

The clash ended in an agreement

It is true, of course, that conflicts

between state and federal agencies have diminished greatly in
recent years as the result of the Justice Department's promotion
of Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees.
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This program

replaces competition with cooperation among law enforcement
agencies and has been very successful.

There really is no need

for double punishment, however, and sentences by state and
federal courts for the same crimes, although not violative of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, appear to
violate its spirit.
In many important respects, the federalization of criminal
law discourages individual involvement and personal participation
in the democratic process, and this is the final consequence I
intend to address.

Probably the greatest danger to the republic

today is the apathy of the citizenry.

For many years, I have

told the story of the jury foreman who announces a verdict in
these words:

"Your Honor, we have decided not to get involved."

Involvement, of course, is the key to the success of our form of
government.

My wife spends a great deal of time speaking at

schools and colleges and wherever else young people gather to
encourage the type of involvement of which I speak.

Yet

participation is most lacking at the level where it should be the
most widespread -- the local government level.

The citizenry

increasingly has been conditioned to turn to federal law
enforcement and to the federal courts as the first line of
defense against anti-social conduct.

What we are witnessing is

an abdication of responsibility for self-government.

In the face

of municipal corruption, it is easy to send for the "feds."

If

narcotics are sold on the street corners of a major city, it is a
simple matter to invoke high-profile federal criminal prosecution.
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When loansharks and racketeers infest a municipality, local law
enforcement efforts can be relaxed if federal help is on the way.
To invite federal authorities to define and prosecute crime
involving activities primarily of state and local interest is to
concede that state and local government cannot be moved to serve
the will of the people and that the people are willing to forego
their form of government.

I do not believe that Americans are

prepared to make that concession.
By now you know that, at least as far as I am concerned, the
uninhibited growth of federal criminal law has produced some
disturbing consequences.

I have my own thoughts about what needs

to be done, but those are for another day.

Hopefully, every

member of this distinguished company also will have some opinions
and suggestions relating to the matters I have discussed.
Regardless of where we stand on some of these issues, we have a
common goal and that is to develop the very best criminal justice
system possible.

I am grateful for the opportunity to

participate in this Conference because, like all of you, I am
dedicated to that goal.
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